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Abstract: Are political liberals generous? Are po-
litical conservatives conscientious? Are generous 
people personally agreeable? Research in behav-
ioral genetics and elsewhere increasingly indicates 
a biological basis for the manner in which peo-
ple behave in personal, interpersonal, and polit-
ical situations, but this biological basis does not 
mean behavior in these three very different con-
texts is correlated. In this article, using an original 
data set obtained from nearly three hundred sub-
jects, the authors are able to test for the degree to 
which personal, interpersonal, and political tem-
peraments are related. As expected, the overall cor-
relations are quite low. Standard personality traits 
do not predict political attitudes, and neither polit-
ical attitudes nor personality predicts the extent to 
which subjects are generous in interpersonal situ-
ations. Human behavior is partially biological, but 
the systems involved in shaping political behavior 
seem to be largely but not completely distinct from 
those involved in shaping personal and interper-
sonal behavior. 
Keywords: temperament, political attitude, person-
ality traits, behavior, ideology 
The study of personality remains a contro-versial subfield in psychology, and it is 
doubtful there will ever be universal agree-
ment on its essential component parts. The 
five- factor model—extroversion, agreeable-
ness, conscientiousness, neuroticism (some-
times called emotional stability), and intellect/
imagination (sometimes called openness)—is 
increasingly believed to capture the essence 
of personality (McCrae and Costa 1999; DeY-
oung, Peterson, and Higgins 2005; Mondak 
and Halperin forthcoming), but other personal 
temperaments such as risk-taking and harm 
avoidance are also frequently invoked. Still 
other constructs such as right-wing authoritar-
ianism and social dominance orientation fight 
for recognition along with numerous other al-
leged dimensions; the overall result is a con-
ceptual mishmash. Some observers would say 
this confusion is unavoidable given the com-
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plexities of the human condition, but we think progress can be made by rec-
ognizing that not all predispositions are best thought of as stemming from 
personal temperament. In this article, we argue and provide empirical evi-
dence that the behaviors of an individual are not influenced solely by the per-
sonal temperaments traditionally studied by psychologists but also by reason-
ably distinct interpersonal and political temperaments that operate alongside 
personal temperament. 
Distinguishing the Personal from the Interpersonal  
and the Political
Conceptually, personal temperament is quite different from interpersonal 
temperament, and interpersonal temperament, in turn, is quite distinct from 
political temperament. Personal temperament does not require other people 
to be in evidence. Risk-taking could manifest itself while an individual climbs 
a tree far from any other person (though it could also be in evidence in inter-
actions with other people). Interpersonal temperament by definition requires 
another person. It is impossible to know whether a person is generous, trust-
ing, or punitive unless other individuals are involved. But modern society has 
given rise to a third temperament, namely, political temperament. Like inter-
personal, political temperament requires other people; unlike interpersonal, 
political temperament operates on a mass scale. Interpersonal involves those 
in the immediate social unit—fellow players in an economic game, office 
mates at work, or relatives at a family reunion. Political temperament, on the 
other hand, deals with the structure and organization of large-scale social life. 
The issues shift from whether a person nearby should be punished for being 
self-serving to whether in general it is preferable for misbehaving individuals 
to be punished and whether that punishment should be severe and automatic 
or mild and flexible. Politics involves the norms, mores, and statutes that gov-
ern large-scale social life, norms and statutes that do not only apply to people 
well known and close by but also to people unknown and far away. 
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The term politics is frequently used to refer to maneuvering in the immedi-
ate social environment. De Waal (1982, 1996) pointed out that primate troops 
can be seen playing politics of this type; humans will often write off unfavor-
able decisions at work or elsewhere as being shaped by “politics.” Despite 
this common usage, we suggest that politics at the mass level can be distin-
guished from the interpersonal machinations that are often referred to as po-
litical. Thus, for our purposes, personal temperaments are predispositions 
(fastidiousness, for example) that can manifest themselves even when other 
people are not present. Interpersonal temperaments (being generous, for ex-
ample) are at least dyadic in that they involve at a minimum one person in the 
immediate social environment. And political temperaments are those that ap-
ply to the governance of large-scale social life, life that extends beyond one’s 
immediate social environment. 
Whereas personal temperament has been studied mainly by psychologists 
and political temperament mainly by political scientists, interpersonal tem-
perament is of interest to social psychologists as well as to sociologists and 
behavioral economists. Personal and political temperaments are usually as-
sessed by survey questions, while for interpersonal temperament, experi-
ments are often employed to determine the extent to which people share with 
others, trust others, and punish those who have behave selfishly. Trust, gen-
erosity, and interpersonal sanctioning are inherently social; as such they are 
distinct from risk taking or paranoia as well as from liberal or conservative 
political attitudes. 
But are these three temperaments empirically as well as conceptually dis-
tinct? Our operating hypothesis is that they are largely but perhaps not com-
pletely uncorrelated, that individuals’ preferences for the conduct of their 
personal lives are only weakly predictive of their preferences for both large-
scale societal organization and behaviors in concrete, small-scale social situa-
tions. Casual observation would seem to support this hypothesis. When Rush 
Limbaugh was found to be addicted to drugs, his vast radio audience did not 
desert him even though his behavior seemed inconsistent with his political 
arguments in favor of personal responsibility and harsh punishment of law-
breakers. His behavioral lapse was viewed as a personal indiscretion. But if 
he began condoning permissiveness and forgiveness as a political philoso-
phy, his audience quite likely would evaporate quickly. While political liber-
als may take this as evidence of hypocrisy on the right, the truth of the matter 
is that those on the left also separate the political from the personal (and the 
interpersonal). The real message is that people’s personal behaviors are quite 
different from the behaviors they advocate for society as a whole. The conten-
tion that the personal, interpersonal, and political are reasonably separate re-
ceives support from neuroscience studies indicating that the neural systems 
involved with basic personal emotions such as anger, frustration, joy, and ex-
citement are quite different from the neural systems involved in emotions 
that cannot exist except in the context of other people, such as guilt, shame, 
and embarrassment. Our suspicion is that politics, at least in part, may tap 
into yet another neural system. 
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[P]eople’s personal behaviors are quite 
 different from the behaviors they advocate for 
 society as a whole.
Though we believe there is support for our expectation of relative indepen-
dence across the temperaments, other expectations are possible. Perhaps in-
terpersonal and political temperaments are merely spin-offs of personal tem-
perament. Or perhaps the political is easily predicted from the interpersonal. 
The purpose of this article is to determine the extent to which these three core 
temperaments are related to each other. This is an important issue because if 
the personal is predictive of the political (and also the interpersonal), under-
standing personal temperament is all that is necessary for the understanding 
of interpersonal. Political behavior and the other social sciences would there-
fore become a subfield of psychology. But to the extent that political and in-
terpersonal temperaments do not correlate with personal temperament, these 
areas of study must be undertaken with separate approaches, theories, and 
expectations. This situation becomes especially important for those interested 
in identifying the biological systems pertinent to temperaments and behav-
iors. Much is known about the genetic and biological precursors of personal 
temperament (see van Gestel and van Broeckhoven 2003; Comings et al. 2000; 
Bouchard and McGue 2003; Bachner-Melman et al. 2005; Carmen 2007 [this 
volume]), but little is known about the extent to which this information also 
informs us of the genes and biological systems pertinent to interpersonal and 
political temperaments. Thus, information on the overlap of personal, inter-
personal, and political phenotypes is loaded with implications for our under-
standing of human behavior as well as for identifying the best methods for 
studying that behavior. 
Previous Research on the Connection of the  
Three Different Temperaments
Given our formulation of three categories of temperaments, we can make 
three possible links among these categories: the link between the personal 
and the political, the link between the personal and the interpersonal, and the 
link between the interpersonal and the political. Previous research has looked 
into each of these links, although not always as intensely as the topic deserves 
and with a surprising amount of variance in the answers obtained. We take 
each of the links in turn. 
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Personal temperament and political temperament 
Of the three links, this is the one that has been analyzed the most. Academ-
ics have long suspected that particular personal temperaments may be the rea-
son some individuals are, for example, politically conservative. Adorno et al.’s 
(1950) assertion that there is an “authoritarian personality” is perhaps the best-
known early attempt to link personal and political temperaments. The claim is 
that people who prefer to live their own lives in an authoritarian fashion also 
prefer authoritarian political arrangements; that some people have a need for 
structure, hierarchy, and clarity; and that this need is manifested in all aspects 
of their lives from personal to political. Altemeyer (1981, 1996) extended these 
ideas, suggested measurement changes, and termed it “right-wing authoritar-
ianism,” much to the consternation of those who believe hierarchy and struc-
ture are advocated as much by those on the political left as the political right 
(think Lenin; for an example of such a critique, see Shils 1954). 
McClosky (1958, 28) also asserted that there is a “conservative personal-
ity,” that conservatism is a position “around which individuals of certain ha-
bitual outlooks, temperaments, and sensibilities can comfortably come to rest 
and be united with others of like disposition.” And the temperaments and 
dispositions McClosky found to be associated with conservatism are not par-
ticularly desirable. His data led him to conclude that conservatism is typically 
the philosophy of “social isolates, of people who think poorly of themselves, 
who suffer personal disgruntlement and frustration, who are submissive, 
timid, and wanting in confidence, who lack a clear sense of direction and pur-
pose, who are uncertain about their values, and who are generally bewildered 
by the alarming task of having to thread their way through a society which 
seems to them too complex to fathom” (p. 37). 
More recent research continues to identify the personality traits of con-
servatism— usually unfavorable traits. Using an imaginative research de-
sign, Block and Block (2005) reported that personality traits of nursery school 
children are predictive of political beliefs held by those same individuals 
when grown up. According to these findings, as children, adult conserva-
tives tend to be “easily offended, indecisive, fearful, rigid, inhibited, and rel-
atively over-controlled and vulnerable”; while children who go on to become 
adult liberals are “self-reliant, energetic, somewhat dominating, relatively un-
der-controlled, and resilient” (p. 1). The modern consensus seems to be that 
conservatism is the result of a “motivated social cognition,” in other words, 
a view of the social world that springs from a psychic need—in this case a 
need “to reduce fear, anxiety, and uncertainty; to avoid change, disruption, 
and ambiguity” (Jost et al. 2003, 340; see also Jost 2006). 
The relative lack of attention to the personality bases of liberalism is poten-
tially instructive in that it suggests that for many researchers, conservatism is 
the aberration in need of explanation: the normal human condition is political 
liberalism, and those who do not subscribe to it must possess unfortunate and 
lamentable personality traits such as “psychological rigidity” (McClosky 1958, 
42) or runaway “anxiety and uncertainty” (Jost et al. 2003, 340), a need for au-
thority (Altemeyer 1981, 1996; Lakoff 2006), or a need for their group to be bet-
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ter than others (Pratto et al. 1994). Thus, there is a need to explain what is the 
matter with Kansas (Frank 2004) but not to explain what is the matter with, say, 
Massachusetts. Of course, conservatives and others have been quick to chal-
lenge many of the findings summarized above. And indeed it seems that prom-
inent exemplars of American conservatism today, such as Rush Limbaugh, 
Sean Hanity, Newt Gingrich, and Donald Rumsfeld, are not accurately char-
acterized as “submissive, timid, and wanting in confidence”; lacking “a clear 
sense of direction and purpose”; and being “uncertain about their values.” 
When research is restricted to those personality traits psychologists tend 
to identify as central—for example, the “Big Five” of extroversion, agreeable-
ness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and intellect/intelligence—re-
sults are less clear. Using an American sample, Mehrabian (1996) found that 
four of the five core personality traits are not significantly related to politi-
cal ideology, and the fifth, intellect/imagination, is related to conservatism at 
only –.26 (see also Comrey and Newmeyer 1965). Caprara’s (Caprara, Barba-
ranelli, and Zimbardo 1999; Caprara et al. 2006) large Italian sample shows a 
somewhat stronger relationship than this, with conservatives scoring signifi-
cantly higher than liberals on the extroversion and conscientiousness factors 
and (like Mehrabian 1996) significantly lower on imagination. Mondak and 
Halperin (forthcoming) found self- reported conservatism to be negatively re-
lated to imagination/openness and positively related to both conscientious-
ness and emotional stability (see Whitaker [2006] for additional evidence of 
links between the Big Five personality traits and political views). 
All told, empirical results on this matter therefore are somewhat inconsis-
tent. Not only are individual relationships found to be significant in some in-
stances and insignificant in others, but the direction of significant relation-
ships is sometimes positive and sometimes negative. It is disconcerting, for 
example, that conservatives are in some studies found to be “submissive, 
timid, and wanting in confidence” and in other studies to be extroverted. Part 
of the problem may be the different manners of conceptualizing personality. 
Many psychologists prefer purer personal temperaments such as the Big Five, 
but others branch out to hybrid concepts such as right-wing authoritarianism 
and social dominance orientation. As noted by critics (see, for example, Ray 
1985), several of the items used to tap these latter concepts seem to draw on 
political attitudes, suggesting that relationships ostensibly between personal-
ity traits and political views are actually relationships between political views 
and other political views. 
For example, two of the commonly employed social dominance orien-
tation items are “in getting what you want it is sometimes necessary to use 
force against other groups” and “we should strive to make income as equal 
as possible.” And two of the right-wing authoritarianism items suggested 
by Altemeyer (1981, 1996) are “gays and lesbians are just as healthy and 
moral as anybody else” and “God’s laws about abortion, pornography, and 
marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late.” None of these four 
seems to directly tap a core personality trait; rather, all four seem to come 
closer to tapping political and social attitudes. Thus, any correlation be-
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tween indices built on items such as social dominance orientation and right-
wing authoritarianism on one hand and indices of political orientations on 
the other is conceptually suspect in the minds of many. To a certain degree, 
confusion on this matter is indicative of larger confusion on the separation 
between the personal and the political, an issue to which we hope to return 
later in this article. 
All told, empirical results … are  
somewhat inconsistent. … It is disconcerting,  
for example, that conservatives are in some  
studies found to be “submissive, timid, and  
wanting in confidence” and in other studies  
to be extroverted.
Personal temperament and interpersonal temperament 
Less work has been done on the relationship between interpersonal (or 
social) temperament and personal temperament. Most of the research in 
this area measures interpersonal behavior by decisions made in laboratory 
games involving small sums of money. These games include the dictator 
game, in which one player (the dictator) is free to divide a sum of money 
with another player however the dictator sees fit; the ultimatum game, in 
which, in contrast to the dictator game, the receiving player now has the 
option of accepting or rejecting the allocator’s proposal; the trust game, in 
which the money a player sends to the other player is tripled but then is 
placed entirely under the discretion of the receiving (trusted) player; and 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which cooperative play is rewarded assuming 
the other player cooperates as well. Thus, measures of interpersonal gen-
erosity, punitiveness, trust, and cooperation are possible. Personal tem-
peraments are measured by a variety of diverse schemes from the Eysenck 
Personality Quotient to Myers-Briggs to type A/sensation-seeking/self-
monitoring/ locus of control categories. 
The results of these studies are as diverse as the approaches. Boone, De 
Branbander, and van Witteloostuijn (1999) found people with an internal 
locus of control, those with high self-monitoring, and those high in sensa-
tion seeking all tend to be slightly more likely to display cooperative be-
havior, particularly in multiple play games. Brandstatter and Guth (2002) 
conducted similar studies with a broader range of economic games, but the 
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personality inventories they employed are more limited. They discovered 
that subjects claiming to be benevolent are more generous in dictator games 
(where the other player has no power) than they are in ultimatum games 
(where the other player can at least veto the proposal), but for the most part, 
the link to core personality traits is either untested or found to be absent. Fi-
nally, Swope et al. (2005), using the Myers- Briggs set of personality indica-
tors, found no direct effects of any of the four categories of personality (ori-
entation, perception, judgment, and attitude) on economic behavior, though 
they did find a small effect of personality on economic game play when the 
extroversion/introversion spectrum (orientation) is interacted with the feel-
ing/thinking (judgment) spectrum. Individuals who are extroverted and 
tend to use feeling rather than thinking in their judgments are more cooper-
ative in economic games. 
Interpersonal temperament and political temperament 
The connection between interpersonal behavior and political attitudes 
has likewise been the subject of less previous research than the possible 
connection between personal temperament and political temperament, and 
here again, the results suggest there may not be much of a connection. Early 
work by Mestelman and Feeny (1988) found suggestive evidence that, com-
pared to liberals, conservatives are slightly more likely to free ride in a pub-
lic goods game. (The public goods game has more than two players, and 
each player has the choice of contributing to a public fund or keeping their 
allotment. Money contributed to the public fund is multiplied but distrib-
uted back to all participants whether they contributed or not, so the optimal 
strategy from a selfish point of view is not to contribute but to take advan-
tage of those who do contribute.) Using a German sample, Fehr et al. (2002) 
found a weak connection between party affiliation (but not ideological posi-
tion) and trusting behavior. 
And in perhaps the study most directly relevant to ours, Anderson, Mel-
lor, and Milyo (2004), also using a public goods game, found “no signifi-
cant differences in contribution for any one group of subjects” (Democrats, 
Republicans, liberals, or conservatives). These same scholars employed a 
trust game and (except for one special situation) reported similarly weak 
results across the various political groups. Their overall conclusion is that, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, liberals are not more likely to “play nice” 
than conservatives. All in all, a connection between political temperament 
and interpersonal temperament is not usually in evidence in these experi-
mental studies. 
Like the purported link between personal temperament and political tem-
perament and the link between personal and interpersonal temperaments, 
this third possible link is found to be empirically weak. Previous research is 
quite inconsistent in findings, but one thing that can be said with some cer-
tainty is that neither the personal, the interpersonal, nor the political deter-
mines the other components. The human condition seems to be quite com-
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partmentalized depending upon the context in which decisions are made. 
But the varying results from these previous studies as well as the fact that all 
studies focus on just two of the temperaments rather than all three encourage 
us to collect our own original data and to perform our own analyses. 
Research Design
In this article, we take advantage of a unique data set that contains infor-
mation on each subject’s personal, interpersonal, and political temperaments, 
thus making it possible to tie together the whole package. The 299 subjects 
were a combination of Rice University students and other nonstudent subjects 
recruited from the Houston metropolitan area. Each was asked an extensive 
array of personality items, including batteries tapping the Big Five. They were 
asked a set of political items, including the Wilson-Patterson Inventory of po-
litical and social attitudes, party identification, and self-identified ideology. 
And they were asked to play a series of economic games in which they had to 
make decisions including whether to be generous and whether to be punitive. 
The results for each type of temperament individually are of interest, but our 
primary concern here is with the correlations across temperaments, from per-
sonal to interpersonal to political. We want to clarify the uncertainty present 
in previous research and to determine whether our overarching hypothesis (a 
negligible relationship across temperaments) is correct. 
Findings
Table 1 provides correlations for the Big Five personality factors, self-in-
terest versus generosity in experimental games, and the two measures of 
ideology described above. Not all of the subjects participated in the same 
set of economic games; our experimental measure of behavioral generos-
ity comes from combining two distinct pools of subjects. The larger group 
of 211 was given a choice of how much money to withdraw from a com-
mon pool of funds and could choose any amount from $0 to $10. The modal 
choice was $5 with a second, less prominent peak at $10. The remaining 
88 subjects were dividing $10 with another player in an ultimatum game 
where their choice was how much of the $10 to keep for themselves and 
how much to give to the other player. Again, as in the common pool with-
drawal, the modal choice was to retain $5 with a second, much smaller peak 
at retaining $10. In the table we provide both the results divided by game 
type and the combined dollar score for both groups. Clearly, there is lit-
tle evidence of any direct connection between personality and behavioral 
generosity. Pool withdrawal is modestly correlated with two of the Big Five 
personality measures, negatively with conscientiousness (with individuals 
scoring higher on conscientiousness withdrawing modestly fewer dollars) 
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and positively with intellect (with individuals scoring higher on intellect/
imagination withdrawing slightly more dollars). Self-interest in the ultima-
tum game is very weakly related to the Big Five dimensions, and none of 
the correlations reaches statistical significance. When the two measures are 
combined, interpersonal self-interest is significantly related only to dimen-
sion five (intellect/imagination) where the modest positive relationship of 
intellect with selfishness is statistically significant. 
Political ideology fares even worse. While consistently negative, indicat-
ing that higher levels of self-interest are associated with liberalism, the cor-
relations for both self-described ideology and the Wilson-Patterson issue-
based measure of ideology are small and fail to reach statistical significance. 
The correlation of personality traits with political ideology is a little more 
promising but still weak on the whole. Consistent with most all previous re-
search, we find a negative relationship between intellect/imagination and 
ideological conservatism. Inconsistent with some previous research, we find 
no link between either conscientiousness or emotional stability and conser-
vatism and we do find a negative relationship between agreeableness and 
conservatism. 
One possible explanation for the general weakness of the correlations be-
tween personality and ideology is the presence of a nonlinear relationship. A 
particular personality factor, for example high intelligence, might be character-
istic of both highly liberal and highly conservative individuals while generally 
less characteristic of moderates. Such a U-shaped relationship would be an ex-
ample of a clearly predictive role for a personality factor but would nonetheless 
produce the sort of attenuated correlations that we see here. Exploring this pos-
sibility by fitting a variety of nonlinear models to the association between per-
sonality factors and ideology did not produce significant evidence of any sort 
of nonlinear relationship. Thus, the generally weak association between per-
Table 1. Personality, Interpersonal Economic Choices, and Ideology
                                                                                           Self-Interest 
                                                     Pool                                                   Ideology  Wilson-Patterson 
                                            Withdrawal   Ultimatum   Combined   (Self-ID)              Index 
Big Five 
1. Extroversion  –.024  .012  –.120  –.097  –.086 
2. Agreeableness  –.093  –.006  –.074  –.153*  –.116* 
3. Conscientiousness  –.140*  .057  –.088  .012  .082 
4. Emotional stability  –.008  .181  .026  –.021  .010 
5. Intellect/imagination  .153*  .015  .126*  –.136*  –.133*
Ideology (self-ID)  –.051  –.031  –.053
Wilson-Patterson index  –.051  –.018  –.053  .721*
n  211  88  299  299  299 
* Significant at the .05 level. 
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sonality and directional ideology is matched by little association between per-
sonality and nondirectional intensity of ideological sentiment. 
The Wilson-Patterson Inventory is a useful addition to self-described ide-
ology in part because it allows a more fine-grained analysis of how personal-
ity factors might affect distinct subcategories of ideology and even individual 
issue positions. Table 2 provides the correlations between the previously dis-
cussed five personality factors and the thirty items that make up the version 
of the Wilson-Patterson Inventory used here. 
None of the thirty individual items is significantly related to more than 
three of the Big Five factors, and in fact only one of the thirty (foreign aid) is 
significantly related to three factors. A little more than a third of the individ-
ual items exhibit no significant relationship to any of the Big Five personal-
ity factors. And this group includes such high-profile items as abortion, gay 
rights, capitalism, pacifism, nuclear power, living together, school prayer, 
and mercy killing. This is striking not only because many of these are viewed 
as deeply emotional hot-button issues but also in light of the association of 
many of these issues with fundamental personal traits such as religiosity and 
the fact that several of these are among the most genetically heritable items in 
the Wilson-Patterson Inventory. Clearly people’s strong emotional reactions 
to these items stem at least in part from very deep sources, but the standard 
Big Five model of personality is not tapping any of this variation. 
Viewing the table down the columns is also informative. Factors 3 and 4 
(conscientiousness and emotional stability, respectively) are notably weak 
predictors of individual issue positions with only three significant correla-
tions in their collective sixty potential relationships, precisely what we would 
expect simply by chance at the .05 level of significance. Factor 2 (agreeable-
ness) provides the most evidence of association with individual issue items, 
showing a significant relationship with thirteen of the thirty Wilson-Patterson 
issues. Higher levels of agreeableness are associated with opposition to the 
death penalty, segregation, and evolution and are also associated with higher 
levels of support for women’s liberation, foreign aid, gun control, property 
tax, and labor unions. Factor 5 (intellect/imagination) yields eight statistically 
significant correlations, including a positive association between higher levels 
of imagination and a lack of support for astrology and the moral majority. 
Overall, the results in Tables 1 and 2, while not unexpected based on pre-
vious research, are still counterintuitive. Most people would probably agree 
with the characterization that an outgoing, agreeable, conscientious, emotion-
ally stable, and intellectually open person would be substantially more gen-
erous in their decisions than a withdrawn, uncaring, sloppy, emotionally un-
stable, and closed- minded person. Similarly, as the pejorative descriptions of 
political conservatism quoted earlier make clear, it has been suggested that 
generous people are typically liberals (those with at least modest opposi-
tion to policies such as the death penalty), but again our data provide no sup-
port for any such relationship. The lack of a substantial significant association 
here between personality or ideology on one hand and behavioral generos-
ity on the other is particularly stark given that this is a controlled experimen-
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tal behavior. The failure to find clear associations between personal attitudes 
and behaviors in previous studies has often been attributed to the complex-
ity of contextual impacts on individual behavior; in real-world behavior, the 
large array of varying contextual cues may in fact severely attenuate any rela-
tionship between personality and behavior, but here experimental control re-
duces both the volume and variation in context and should allow any effects 
to be clearly discernible. 
The lack of a substantial significant association  
here between personality or ideology on one  
hand and behavioral generosity on the other is  
particularly stark given that this is a controlled  
experimental behavior.
As was the case with personality and behavioral generosity, personality and 
ideology are only modestly related. The findings are quite similar for both self- 
identified ideology and the issue-based Wilson-Patterson index (not surprising 
given that they are positively correlated with each other at .72). Both show a 
modest but statistically significant correlation with factor 2 (agreeableness) and 
with factor 5 (intellectual openness). As both liberals and conservatives would 
probably expect, agreeableness, a personality factor partially associated with 
the desire to please others, is more evident in liberals than in conservatives. For 
example, one of the items included in the agreeableness scale is “I have a soft 
heart,” something that liberals would generally agree is a positive trait of liber-
als and conservatives would agree is a negative trait of liberals. 
The association of liberalism with relatively high levels of self-described in-
tellect and imagination is more contentious. Liberals will have no problem ac-
cepting the validity of this finding, but conservatives will undoubtedly be less 
pleased. This factor is sometimes labeled simply as openness both to reduce 
its association with the volatile issue of variation in intelligence and to suggest 
that it in fact measures openness to new experience as opposed to quality of 
brain power. The fact is, however, that at least in the reduced form used here, 
factor 5 is clearly a measure of intellect and imagination rather than openness 
to new experience. Items such as “I have excellent ideas,” “I am quick to un-
derstand things,” and “I use difficult words” clearly illustrate a focus on intel-
lectual capability and imagination rather than simple tolerance for ambiguity. 
On the other hand, as these are all self-descriptions, conservatives could be for-
given for pointing out that this might reflect little more than a tendency toward 
self-serving intellectual pomposity among self-described liberals. 
While the two positive associations are interesting, it is important not to 
miss the larger picture. Both of the correlations are quite weak, and there is 
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no significant association for the other three facets of personality. The lack of 
a relationship for factor 3 (conscientiousness) is surprising. Both liberals and 
conservatives would probably agree that conscientiousness is a characteristic 
more closely tied to conservatism than to liberalism, and while the direction 
of the relationship is correct, the correlation is small and far short of signifi-
cance. The correlation for factor 1 (extroversion) is in the negative direction, 
as might be expected from some of the pejorative descriptions of conserva-
tism cited above, but again the correlation is weak and far short of statisti-
cal significance. The weakest relationship with ideology is factor 4 (emotional 
stability), and this places our findings clearly at odds with the previous pejo-
rative descriptions of conservatism. Emotional stability or the lack thereof ap-
pears to be shared equally across the ideological spectrum, and we find no 
evidence to support the strong assertions in previous discussions that conser-
vatives are more emotionally vulnerable than liberals. 
Taken together, all of this suggests a surprisingly weak relationship between 
personality, interpersonal behavior, and political ideology. Neither personality 
nor broader political ideology offers much predictive power when applied to 
simple controlled experimental observation of behavioral generosity. The rela-
tionship between personality and political ideology is similarly weak. 
Neither personality nor broader political  
ideology offers much predictive power when  
applied to simple controlled experimental  
observation of behavioral generosity. The  
relationship between personality and political 
 ideology is similarly weak.
Discussion
Empirical evidence of substantial interpersonal generosity has eroded the 
emphasis on rational self-interested behavior in both economics and political 
science. These findings, consistent with our findings here (recall that retain-
ing half of the $10 is clearly the modal behavior in both of our experimental 
settings), simply cannot be explained by a model of self-interested, cognitive 
maximization. The attempt to account for these experimental findings has led 
to an explosion of concern across the social sciences and beyond for an un-
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derstanding of the evolution of cooperative social behavior in humans. If the 
impetus toward self-sacrificing behavior has been encoded deeply within the 
human brain, one might expect to find it expressed organically in fundamen-
tal variation in personality. In contrast, if socially conscious self-sacrifice is 
largely culturally constructed, one might expect to find it encoded in more 
intellectually abstract cognitive organizational structures such as ideology. 
Those favoring a nature-plus-nurture view would likely argue that prosocial 
behavior is in fact embedded interactively in both our fundamental person-
ality and our cognitively elaborated ideologies. Despite the obvious impor-
tance of understanding the genesis of self-sacrificing behavior, little empirical 
work in political science has been directed at understanding the relationship 
between this behavior and either underlying personality traits or overarching 
ideological frameworks. 
The findings here hold out little hope for any of these hypotheses. Deeply 
encoded, stable personality traits offer little predictive purchase on self-sac-
rificing prosocial behavior, and ideology fares no better, though as might be 
expected and as Mondak and Halperin (forthcoming) reported, personality 
seems to do much better in predicting political behaviors such as getting up to 
speak on a political issue. Our view as sketched above differs from the general 
view in several important regards. First, we view ideology as being no less 
deeply encoded in the genes and brains of humans than personality. Further-
more, we are not harnessed to a conception that yields clear centrality to per-
sonality as an explanatory variable on the basis of its presumed unique deep 
encoding. Placing both personality and something as presumably abstract as 
ideology abreast of each other in terms of their level of biological encoding, 
and hence temporal priority, allows for an alternative view of the sources of 
interpersonal generosity. Rather than arising from either of these deeply en-
coded temperaments, interpersonal generosity may arise from a conceptually 
distinct third deeply encoded temperament. If, as we have suggested above, 
each of these distinct realms of human nature originates at a similarly deep 
level, then there is no reason to suppose that they must be closely correlated. 
Some degree of overlap in the physiological systems in which they are instan-
tiated would suggest that modest correlations may exist. This is quite differ-
ent than a model that builds interpersonal behavior out of biologically en-
coded personality and then, in turn, builds culturally elaborated ideology out 
of some combination of both personality and interpersonal behavior. 
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